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DOES THE LAW ENCOURAGE
UNETHICAL CONDUCT IN THE
SECURITIES INDUSTRY?
Vincent Di Lorenzo*
A 2002 Citigroup Inc. memo, released as part of a Florida lawsuit,
shows that the bank's own analysts were reluctant to publish less-
biased research over concerns of a backlash from its investment
bankers.
John Hoffmann, the former head of equity research at Citigroup's
Salomon Smith Barney unit, wrote in March 2002 that the firm's
analysts were considering an increase in the number of "negative"
ratings on stocks. In the same memo to Michael Carpenter, then
head of Citigroup's corporate and investment bank, Hoffmann said
doing so would threaten more than $16 billion in fees and risk
putting the firm at a disadvantage.
"Analysts have been told repeatedly that the primary goal of the firm
is to get our equity underwriting market share ranking into the top
three," Hoffmann wrote. "The equity research directors question the
investment bank's ability to accept stricter rating standards at the
expense of revenues."
1
INTRODUCTION
Are corporations committed to compliance with law? The
Principles of Corporate Governance2 demand a corporate commitment
Professor of Law; Senior Fellow, Vincentian Center, St. John's University.
1. Citigroup's Motives Rapped, NEWSDAY, Sept. 9, 2005, at A55.
2. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (1994)
[hereinafter ALI]. The Principles were a fifteen year project of the American Law
Institute. See also Richard B. Smith, An Underview of the Principles of Corporate
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to compliance with law. The obligation exists even when corporate
profits are not maximized. Cost-benefit evaluations in decisions on
legal compliance are rejected. Do these Principles realistically reflect
corporate activity in the market?
This article tests these views against recent evidence of corporate
conduct. Two issues are explored: (a) whether law is determinative of
corporate conduct falling within its scope, and (b) what role cost-benefit
analysis plays in corporate decisions on legal compliance. Part One of
the article explores the ethical obligation to comply with law that U.S.
society has recognized for corporate actors. Two competing
perspectives are examined. First, the viewpoint adopted in the
Principles of Corporate Governance is presented. This viewpoint posits
that law is determinative of corporate conduct. An absolute obligation
to comply with the law's requirements is deemed to exist. This requires
a commitment to legal compliance regardless of the impact on corporate
profits. A second viewpoint is that found in complexity theory.
Complexity theory contends that human behavior, and, in turn, corporate
behavior, is influenced by many factors.3 Law is one influence, but it is
not the sole influence and is not necessarily the determinative influence.
This second perspective is not a normative perspective. Rather, it
examines how corporate decisions are actually reached.
Part Two of this article tests these two viewpoints by examining
evidence of actual market conduct. It explores whether corporate
conduct demonstrates a commitment to legal compliance, including a
commitment to the law's underlying purpose, even when corporate
profits are not maximized. The key finding is that corporations are not
committed to a broad ethical obligation to comply with the law
including an obligation to serve the law's purpose. Legal mandates are
narrowly construed and sought to be evaded. Underlying public policies
are typically ignored. In sum, law is not serving as the determinant of
corporate behavior.
Part Three of this article then examines the role cost-benefit
evaluations play in influencing corporate behavior under various legal
regimes. The influence of cost-benefit evaluations on corporate
Governance, 48 Bus. LAW. 1297 (1993).
3. See, e.g., GREGOIRE NICOLIS & ILYA PRIGOG1NE, EXPLORING COMPLEXITIES: AN
INTRODUCTION 8 (W.H. Freeman & Company 1989) (explaining the required
components for complexity to arise in dynamic systems).
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behavior has been cast aside and, therefore, ignored under the Principles
of Corporate Governance. However, the evidence strongly suggests that
corporations are not ignoring cost-benefit evaluations when making
decisions on legal compliance. In reaching this conclusion, the role of
behavioral tendencies and decision making heuristics are explored to
ascertain their influence on corporate cost-benefit evaluations. The
conclusion drawn is that they cause corporate actors to view
noncompliance with legal mandates as a reasonable decision. As a
result they do not induce a strong commitment to legal compliance. Part
Three of this article then offers an alternative approach to prevailing
legal regimes - an alternative that accepts and embraces cost-benefit
evaluations. It is an alternative that relies on market-based sanctions to
alter cost-benefit evaluations so as to allow the law to exert greater
influence on corporate decisions.
PART ONE - PERSPECTIVES ON THE INFLUENCE OF LAW ON BUSINESS
CONDUCT
A. The Principles of Corporate Governance: Law as a Determinative
Factor
The American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance,
released in 1994, summarized, among other things, the expectations
regarding corporate compliance with law.4 The Principles reflect the
"common understanding of the key legal relationships in the
corporations .... "' Section 2.01 of the Principles of Corporate
Governance begins with the view that a corporation's primary objective
is to enhance corporate profit and shareholder gain.6 However, the
corporation is obliged to act within the boundaries set by law, even if
corporate profit and shareholder gain are not enhanced.7
A minimalist view of the ethical obligations of corporate actors is
that they must comply with the requirements of law, but this means only
adherence to its literal requirements. Even this narrow view of ethical
4. ALI, supra note 2.
5. Id. (Director's Forward).
6. Id. § 2.01.
7. Id. § 2.01(b)(1).
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obligation, however, requires compliance when profits are not
maximized. This article explores whether corporations are committed to
this minimalist ethical standard. It also explores commitment to a
broader ethical standard. A broader view of ethical obligations is one
based upon requirements of law but not limited to the narrow view of
commitment to literal compliance. Instead, it asks corporations to
commit themselves to conduct that not only meets the literal
requirements of governing law but also serves its underlying purpose.8
The American Law Institute embraced the position that the obligation to
comply with law is not a limited duty of literal compliance but should
take into consideration the purposes behind the laws in question. It
explained:
The corporation, like all other citizens, is under an obligation to act
within the boundaries set by law. In determining these boundaries
the corporation should not rest simply on past precedents or an
unduly literal reading of statutes and regulations, but should give
weight to all the considerations that the courts would deem proper to
take into account in their determinations, including relevant
principles, policies, and legislative purposes.
9
The determinative role assumed to be played by the law and
demanded in the Principles of Corporate Governance is contrasted with
their view of the role of cost-benefit analysis in corporate decisions
regarding compliance with law. The American Law Institute went out
of its way to consider and reject the view that the duty to comply with
law depends on the costs of noncompliance as compared with the
economic benefits captured. It noted:
It is sometimes maintained that whether a corporation should adhere
to a given legal rule may properly depend on a kind of cost-benefit
analysis, in which probable corporate gains are weighed against
either probable social costs, measured by the dollar liability imposed
for engaging in such conduct, or probable corporate losses, measured
by potential dollar liability discounted for likelihood of detection.
8. This article limits its exploration of corporate ethical obligations to the
obligation to comply with the law and to demonstrate a commitment to the law's
purpose. Positive law as equivalent to ethical conduct in a commercial setting is
discussed in Bruce D. Fisher, Positive Law as an Ethic: Illustrations of the Ascent of
Positive Law to Ethical Status in the Commercial Sector, 25 J. Bus. ETHICS 115 (2000).
9. ALl, supra note 2, at 60.
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Section 2.01 does not adopt this position. With few exceptions,
dollar liability is not a "price" that can properly be paid for the
privilege of engaging in legally wrongful conduct. Cost-benefit
analysis may have a place in the state's determination whether a
given type of conduct should be deemed legally wrongful. Once that
determination has been made, however, the resulting legal rule
normally represents a community decision that the conduct is
wrongful as such, so that cost-benefit analysis whether to obey the
rule is out of place.... Section 2.01(b)(l) is based on the moral
norm of obedience to law. 10
This is an ethical viewpoint that rejects very narrow interpretations
of legal requirements and, therefore, rejects attempts to evade legal
requirements. In cases of uncertainty, conduct consistent with the law's
purpose is the proper standard against which to judge ethical conduct.
B. Organizational Theory: Complexity and Corporate Decisions
Complexity theory, sometimes referred to as chaos theory, presents
a different view of the determinants of human behavior, including
corporate conduct. It is not a normative viewpoint but one that
examines actual conduct in the market. The starting point in complexity
theory as applied to human behavior is that actions are influenced by
many factors. Complexity recognizes that an effect is often not the
product of one constant cause. Rather, it results from the interaction of
many forces. 1  In corporate decision making, this includes cost
projections, risk projections, legal mandates, industry norms, societal
norms, as well as other influences (e.g., the personality and viewpoint of
the CEO). The strength of the influence of each factor (e.g., risk
projections) varies over time and within different factual contexts. The
outcome (decision) is a result of the interaction of all of the relevant
influences and the synergy produced from such interaction. In other
words, there is not a linear relationship between a particular influence
and resultant outcomes.12
10. Id. comment g.
11. NICOLIS & PRIGOGINE, supra note 3, at 6.
12. In linear systems, there is a proportionate relationship between cause and
effect, and the mathematical relationship between variables is stable. In nonlinear
systems, the cause-effect relationship is not proportionate and relationships between
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Organizational theorists have embraced complexity theory and
applied it to decision making in business organizations. 13  Thus, the
theory has been applied to analyze how information is processed in
organizations. 14  It has also been applied to characterize successful
organizations as organizations that embrace and respond to principles
recognized in complexity theory, such as nonlinear feedback and chaotic
equilibrium. 5 Organizational behavior as seen through the lens of
complexity theory is summarized in the following study's findings
regarding corporate environmental performance:
Corporate environmental behavior and motivation are extremely
complex. They involve the interaction of numerous variables,
difficult to measure. It is harder still to assign an appropriate weight
to each variable, or to perform a reliable quantitative multivariate
regression analysis.... Nevertheless,.. . [b]oth our quantitative and
qualitative analysis leave us convinced that theories of corporate
environmental behavior that focus on a single variable - whether
legal, economic, or attitudinal - are almost always doomed to be
incomplete and inadequate.
16
Given the complexity that characterizes corporate decision making,
the best evidence of the influence of various factors on corporate
decisions is to study outcomes under varying legal regimes. Actual
market conduct reflects the interaction of various variables, including
law.
Earlier studies have found that various influences play a role in
corporate decisions regarding corporate compliance with law -
influences in addition to the legal mandate or the sanction imposed for
variables are dynamic, rather than stable. JAMES GLEICK, CHAOS: MAKING A NEW
SCIENCE 23-25 (1987).
13. See Robert Kagan, Neil Cunningham & Dorothy Thornton, Explaining
Corporate Environmental Performance: How Does Regulation Matter? 37 LAW &
Soc'Y REv. 51, 76-78 (2003).
14. SIEGFRIED STREUFERT & ROBERT W. SWEZEY, COMPLEXITY, MANAGERS AND
ORGANIZATIONS 2 (1986).
15. RALPH D. STACEY, MANAGING THE UNKNOWABLE: STRATEGIC BOUNDARIES
BETWEEN ORDER AND CHAOS IN ORGANIZATIONS chs. 3, 4 (1992). The concept of
equilibrium points within an outer boundary set by a strange attractor is discussed infra
notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
16. Kagan, Gunningham & Thornton, supra note 13, at 76.
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violation.17 The studies have called into question the influence of the
severity of sanctions on legal compliance,' 8 and whether the perceived
obligation to comply with a legal mandate is the most important factor
determining corporate conduct. 19
Recognition that non-legal factors play an important role in
influencing corporate decisions, combined with complexity theory's
concept of nonlinear relationship between various influences and a
particular outcome, has led some commentators to conclude that law is
unnecessary to induce ethical business conduct.2 °  However, the
17. Peter J. May, Compliance Motivations: Affirmative and Negative Bases, 38
LAW & Soc'Y REV. 41 (2004) (summarizing prior studies regarding the influence of
various factors such as inspection frequency and consistency, perceived legitimacy of
regulations, reputation, and ability to comply, including costs and competitive effects);
Kagan, Gunningham & Thornton, supra note 13, at 67-69 (finding firm-level economic
differences and community pressures as having significant effects on companies'
environmental performance); BRENT FISSE & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, THE IMPACT OF
PUBLICITY ON CORPORATE OFFENDERS 227, 233, 243 (1983) (showing studies of
adverse publicity and corporate reaction to it, finding many of the companies studied
introduced substantial reforms in the wake of their adverse publicity crisis which,
although perhaps in only a small way, would reduce the probability of recurrence of the
offense or wrongdoing. In many cases thorough ongoing reform was forsaken for
piecemeal changes).
18. May, supra note 17, at 55-56 (showing that studies are mixed with respect to
findings concerning the effect of the level of sanctions for compelling compliance, and
this study finds that fear of sanctions and fear of legal liability has little effect); John
Braithwaite & Toni Makkai, Testing an Expected Utility Model of Corporate
Deterrence, 25 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 7, 8, 24 (1991) (discussing that studies have shown
very little support for an effect of the perceived severity of sanctions on compliance,
and this study confirms this conclusion for organizations). Contra Steven Klepper &
Daniel Nagin, Tax Compliance and Perceptions of the Risks of Detection and Criminal
Prosecution, 23 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 209 (1989), and Harold G. Grasmick & George J.
Bryjack, The Deterrent Effect of Perceived Severity of Punishment, 59 SOc. FORCES 471
(1980) (explaining how risk of criminal prosecution and perceived severity of sanction
affects conduct).
19. May, supra note 17, at 55 (finding that the duty to comply with legal
requirements was cited as an important motivation by respondents but less important
than reputation as a motivation for compliance and almost equally important to
marketplace demands as a motivation).
20. See Greg Ip, A Less- Visible Role For the Fed Chief: Freeing Up Markets,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 19, 2004, at A8 (quoting a view articulated in the 1960s by Alan
Greenspan that it is in the self-interest of every business to maintain its reputation - a
reputation for honest dealings and a quality product - and regulation undermines this
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deficiency in this conclusion is that it is an untested conclusion. This
article explores this issue as well.
Theoretically, legal mandates can control outcomes if corporations
are committed to compliance with law. In such a scenario, the legal
mandate would override all other influences on corporate behavior. This
is the assumption in the Principles of Corporate Governance. This
article examines recent corporate conduct to further explore the
influence of law on corporate decisions, more specifically whether or
when it is a determinative influence. It also explores whether market
based sanctions can exert a greater influence on corporate decision
making.
PART Two - A STUDY OF CORPORATE CONDUCT - THE SECURITIES
INDUSTRY
There are many unethical business practices that have come to light
in the securities industry in recent years. These include illegal allocation
of shares in initial public offerings,2' trading abuses by mutual fund
companies, 22 lack of due diligence by underwriters leading to defrauding
of investors,23 illegal practices in sales of variable annuities including
superlatively moral system). E.g., Victor P. Goldberg, Accountable Accountants: Is
Third-Party Liability Necessary?, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 295 (1988); Ronald J. Gilson &
Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanics of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REv. 549 (1984)
(arguing that reputation provides a sufficient incentive for auditors to detect fraud and
imposing is unnecessary).
21. JP. Morgan Agrees to $25 Million Penalty in Settling SEC Allegations of IPO
Abuses, 35 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA), at 1642 (Oct. 6, 2003) (showing settlements
between SEC and J.P. Morgan Chase, FleetBoston, and Credit Suisse First Boston).
22. David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States, Assessment of
Regulatory Reforms to Improve the Management and Sale of Mutual Funds, GAO-04-
533T, at 2, 6 (Mar. 10, 2004) (finding that as of March 1, 2004, the SEC had formally
announced seven enforcement actions involving broker-dealers and other firms
involved in late trading schemes, and twelve cases involving market timing activities,
including five that also involved late trading); Christopher Oster, Settlements in Wake of
Scandal Include Payments That Extend Beyond Refund of Tainted Profits, WALL ST. J.,
June 29, 2004, at D1 (noting that mutual fund companies have agreed to settlements
totaling more than $2 billion, and this is sure to grow substantially as ten mutual fund
companies have yet to settle).
23. E.g., Mitchell Pacelle, Citigroup Will Pay $2.65 Billion to Settle WorldCom
Investor Suit, WALL ST. J., May 11, 2004, at Al (displaying a settlement with investors
in suit against 17 underwriters, including Citigroup, J.P. Morgan Chase, Deutsche Bank
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market timing, violation of suitability rules, and inadequate disclosure,24
and sex discrimination.2 ' This article focuses on misleading reports
issued by securities analysts. It presents a case study of industry cost-
benefit evaluations that lead the corporate actor to evade or, at times,
ignore the law.
A. The Challenge
Securities analysts evaluate securities and estimate their value as
investments for potential investors. They collect and review information
about the corporations that they are evaluating, including information
found in company documents filed with the SEC, materials sent to
shareholders, trade publications, and information obtained in interviews
with company officers and employees and visits to company sites.26 So
called "sell-side analysts" are generally employed by brokerage firms
and produce reports and buy-sell recommendations for the firm's
and Bank of America); Kurt Eichenwald, Jury Convicts 5 Involved In Enron Deal With
Merrill, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2004, at C1 (noting that a jury found that five defendants,
including four former executives of Merrill Lynch, had conspired to help Enron report
bogus profits. The convicted defendants include the former head of global investment
banking at Merrill Lynch, and the former head of the firm's project and lease finance
group).
24. Annuities Deal Criticized, NEWSDAY, June 10, 2004, at A53 (finding that in the
past two years the NASD had taken more than 80 disciplinary actions against brokers
and investment firms, including Prudential and American Express, for abuses in sales of
variable annuities); National Association of Securities Dealers, NASD Fines Prudential
$2 million; Orders $9.5 Million to Customers for Annuity Sales in Violation of NY
Insurance Regs, New Release (Jan. 29, 2004), available at http://www.nasd.com/
web/idcplg?IdcService=SSGETPAGE&ssDocName=NASDW_002856 (involving
Prudential Equity Group, formerly known as Prudential Securities, and Prudential
Investment Management Services).
25. Patrick McGeehan, Morgan Stanley Settles Bias Suit With $54 Million, N.Y.
TIMES, July 13, 2004, at Al (discussing a settlement reached with Morgan Stanley;
earlier settlements with Merrill Lynch and Smith Barney resulted in more than $200
million in payments); Patrick McGeehan, Merrill Lynch Ordered to Pay For Sexual
Bias, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2004, at Al.
26. The role of securities analysts is summarized in Jill E. Fisch & Hillary A. Sale,
The Securities Analyst As Agent: Rethinking the Regulation of Analysts, 88 IOWA L.
REv. 1035, 1040-42 (2003); John L. Orcutt, Investor Skepticism v. Investor Confidence:
Why the New Research Analyst Reforms Will Harm Investors, 81 DENV. U. L. REv. 1, 7-
9 (2003).
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customers and other investors. The reports include predictions of future
27earnings.
The investors that might rely on the reports and recommendations
are not typically sophisticated investment entities that regularly trade in
securities, such as mutual funds, hedge funds, insurance companies or
retirement funds. Rather, such entities employ their own, so-called
"buy-side analysts" who generate reports solely for their employers and
not for the general public.28 In recent decades more and more
individuals have embraced the securities market as a vehicle for
channeling their savings and other financial assets.2 9 Thus, individual
investors and, in many cases, unsophisticated individual investors are
increasingly the recipients of analysts' reports and recommendations.
Analysts face conflicts of interest on several fronts. First, they are
employed by securities firms, and analysts' recommendations generate
brokerage commission revenues for their employers.3 In a related vein,
the securities firms typically engage in the investment banking business
as well. Securities analysts help to develop and maintain relationships
with investment banking clients of the firm, and, therefore, generate
investment banking fees for their employers. 31 Examples of the conflict
27. Fisch & Sale, supra note 26, at 1042; Orcutt, supra note 26, at 8 (research
reports are typically made available only to clients of the brokerage firm, although in
recent years many firms have begun to distribute reports to non-clients).
28. Orcutt, supra note 26, at 8-9 (although buy-side analysts do use sell-side
research as a source of information).
29. Overall individual investor participation in the stock market has risen from 30.2
million U.S. shareowners in 1980 to 84.3 million in 2002. Securities Industry
Association, Key Trends in the Securities Industry, available at
http://www.sia.com/research/html/keyindustrytrends .html (last visited Nov. 8,
2004). This includes individual stock ownership, both inside and outside employer-
sponsored retirement plans, and ownership stock of mutual funds. Individual stock
ownership outside employer-sponsored retirement plans extended to 31.5 million
shareowners in 2002. INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE AND SECURITIES INDUSTRY
ASSOCIATION, EQUITY OWNERSHIP IN AMERICA 17 (2002).
30. Orcutt, supra note 26, at 14-15 (stating that research shows that analyst
recommendations can have a substantial impact on both stock prices and trading
volumes, and buy ratings are more likely to encourage trading volumes); Fisch & Sale,
supra note 26, at 1045-46 (noting that in today's world research departments do not
earn revenue; other departments support them).
31. Fisch & Sale, supra note 26, at 1046-47 (finding that analysts have been used
in marketing activities aimed at prospective purchases of new issues of securities);
Orcutt, supra note 26, at 19-21 (showing that after a company is taken public,
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of interest faced by research analysts are provided by the New York
State and SEC investigations of industry practices. At Merrill Lynch,
the head of equity research solicited information from analysts on their
involvement in investment banking so that their compensation could be
calculated. He said:
We are once again surveying your contributions to investment
banking during the year... please complete details on your
involvement in the transaction, paying particular attention to the
degree your research coverage played a role in origination, execution
and follow-up. Please note as well, your involvement in advisory
work on mergers or acquisitions, especially where your coverage
played a role in securing the assignment and you made follow up
marketing calls to clients. Please indicate where your research
coverage was pivotal in securing participation in high yield
offerings.
3 2
Similarly, at Morgan Stanley, research analysts were compensated,
in part, based on the degree to which they helped generate investment
banking business for the firm. In their annual performance evaluation,
analysts were asked to submit self-evaluations that often included their
involvement in investment banking, including a description of specific
transactions and the fees generated.3 3 One analyst's evaluation stated
"Bottom line, my highest and best use is to help [Morgan Stanley] win
the best Internet IPO mandates ....,
Second, in the past, analysts were paid by their employers based, in
large part, on their ability to generate investment banking business, as
well as on their reputation among investors, as reflected in annual
investment banks compete for additional stock and debt offerings and for financial
advisory work, and sell-side analysts can play an important role in securing fees
generated from their activities).
32. United States Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Technology,
Hearing on Corporate Governance, Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs,
Foreign Commerce and Tourism of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and
Technology, 106th Congress (2002) (testimony of New York State Attorney General
Eliot Spitzer), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/jun/testimony7.pdf.
33. SEC v. Morgan Stanley & Co. Inc., Exchange Act Litigation Release No.
18117, Apr. 28, 2003, available at http://www.sec.gov./litigation/litreleases/
lrl1817.htm.
34. Id. (emphasis in original).
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Institutional Investor rankings.35 Curiously, stock picking and earnings
forecast ratings of analysts did not weigh heavily in these rankings.36
Third, analysts, their employers, and other employees of the firm
commonly had ownership interests in the companies that the analysts
were covering.37 Thus, given these conflicts of interest, the challenge is
to issue fair, accurate research reports and recommendations. From the
standpoint of assessing ethical behavior, in some cases inaccurate
reports and recommendations can violate legal prohibitions aimed at
protecting investors against fraudulent practices.
B. The Legzal Environment
As described below, members of the securities industry have settled
charges of violations of state antifraud statutes, rules of the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) and National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD), as well as violations of the federal securities laws. This article
examines the federal securities law as the governing legal regime. The
regime consists of a vague statutory standard. In that sense, the legal
regime is not different in form than state law38 and the rules of NASD
35. Orcutt, supra note 26, at 21-22 (stating that analysts receive a base salary plus a
discretionary year-end bonus that typically can be fifty percent or more of the analyst's
base salary); Laura S. Unger, Acting Chair, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission,
Testimony Concerning Conflict of Interest Faced by Brokerage Firms and Their
Research Analysts, Before the Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance and
Governmental Sponsored Enterprises, Committee on Financial Services, United States
House of Representatives, July 31, 2001, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
testimony/073101ortslu.htm. The SEC's on-site examinations of nine full service
brokerage firms discovered that, in seven of the nine firms inspected, investment
banking had input into analysts' bonuses and the analyst hiring process. Id. The staff
inspections also reported, "[i]nterviews with former analysts revealed that it was well
understood by all of these analysts that they were not permitted to issue negative
opinions about investment banking clients." Id.
36. Orcutt, supra note 26, at 22.
37. Id. at 22-25; Fisch & Sale, supra note 26, at 1043-44. The SEC's on-site
inspections of nine full service brokerage firms found that about one quarter of the
analysts inspected own securities in the companies they cover. Testimony of Laura S.
Unger, supra note 35.
38. New York's Martin Act prohibits any "fraud, deception, concealment," any
"promise or representation.., which is beyond reasonable expectation or unwarranted
by existing circumstances" and any false representation or statement made to induce or
promote the sale of securities. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352c (1996).
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and NYSE3 9 that are alleged to be violated and that are also vague legal
standards.
The governing statutory standard is found in the antifraud
provisions of the federal securities law. The settlements reached were
based on section 15(c) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934
because the particular securities in question were traded over-the-
counter.40 However, section 10(b) of the Act could have been invoked
for securities other than those traded over-the-counter. 41 These statutes
prohibit "any manipulative, deceptive or other fraudulent device or
contrivance" to induce or attempt to induce the purchase or sale of any
42security.
The purpose behind these antifraud provisions is to protect the
average investor against overreaching. As one leading commentator has
explained:
39. E.g., NASDAQ Inc., Rule 2210(d)(1)(A), available at
http://nasd.complinet.com/nasd/display/display.html?rbid= 1189&elementid= 1159000
480 (stating "Standard Applicable to All Communications with the Public: All member
communications with the public shall be based on principles of fair dealing and good
faith ... [and should] provide a sound basis for evaluating the facts in regard to any
particular security or type of security, industry, or service. No member may omit any
material fact or qualification if the omission, in the light of the context of the material
presented, would cause the communications to be misleading."). See NASDAQ Inc.,
Rule 2210(d)(1)(B) (prohibiting members from making "[e]xaggerated, unwarranted or
misleading statements or claims" in all public communications and stating that "no
member shall, directly or indirectly, publish, circulate or distribute any public
communication that the member knows or has reason to know contains any untrue
statement of a material fact or is otherwise false or misleading."). Id. See also NYSE
Rule 472, available at http://rules.nyse.com/NYSE/NYSERules/ (follow
"Communications with the Public" hyperlink) (providing that "[n]o members or
member organization shall utilize any communication which contains (i) any untrue
statement or omission of a material fact or is otherwise false or misleading; or (ii)
promises of specific results, exaggerated or unwarranted claims; or (iii) opinions for
which there is no reasonable basis; or (iv) projections or forecasts of future events
which are not clearly labeled as forecasts.").
40. See Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES
REGULATION at 904-07, 1060-61 (2004) (broker dealers are subject to section 17a of the
1933 Act, Rule 10b-5, and over-the-counter broker dealers are additionally subject to
15c of the 1934 Act).
41. See id.
42. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(1A-C)(2005). See also 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)(2000).
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The antifraud provisions are part of a statutory scheme that resulted
from a finding that securities are "intricate merchandise" and a
congressional determination that the public interest demanded
legislation that would recognize the gross inequality of bargaining
power between the professional securities firm and the average
investor. "The essential objective of securities legislation is to
protect those who do not know market conditions from the
overreachings of those who do." 
43
In a similar vein, the courts have explained that "[a] fundamental
purpose, common to these [federal securities] statutes, was to substitute
a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and
thus to achieve a high standard of business ethics in the securities
industry."4
Thus, the ethical obligation to act in accordance with the purpose
behind the governing law would require a commitment on the part of
securities firms to insure fair, accurate reports and recommendations on
the part of securities analysts. Did the securities industry's actions
reflect commitment to compliance with the law, including its underlying
purpose?
C. The Industry Response
Through the late 1990s and thereafter, the industry's response was
to ignore the proscription against deceptive statements and practices and,
instead, boost investment banking and brokerage earnings by overstating
predictions of corporate earnings, 45 and maintaining strong "buy"
recommendations 46 for stocks despite analysts' privately held views that
the recommendations were not justified. Also, the response was
43. Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, 7 SEC. REG. 3418-9 (1989) (citations omitted).
44. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
45. Orcutt, supra note 26, at 50 (noting that while academic studies have confirmed
that analysts consistently overestimated earnings forecasts, these studies did not isolate
the cause of the overestimates).
46. Id. at 11-13 (finding that studies have confirmed over-optimism in buy
recommendations). See also Fisch & Sale, supra note 26, at 1045-46 (concluding that
analysts' recommendations are consistent with their employer's incentives but not those
of the investing public). Also, independent analysts' behavior differs substantially from
that of analysts employed by securities firms. Id. at 1051. These studies do not
document the cause of the over-optimism.
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frequently to boost personal fortunes by issuing rosy forecasts for stocks
in which the analyst, the analyst's employer, or other employees had an
equity stake that they could sell after a lock-up period.47
Charges alleging such activities have been brought and have been
settled against twelve securities firms.48 The practices uncovered have
been characterized as widespread and continuing for many years as an
industry practice.49 Some examples illustrate the industry viewpoint that
increased profits was more important than a commitment to fair and
accurate reports and recommendations by analysts.
At Merrill Lynch, analysts provided Infospace, Inc. with the firm's
highest rating, but privately the analysts labeled Infospace "a powder
keg" and a "piece of junk."50  Similarly, Merrill Lynch "was urging
customers to buy [Lifeminders, Inc.] while Merrill Lynch analysts
privately were referring to the company as a 'p.o.s.' Let [us] simply say
that p.o.s. is a euphemism for an extremely poor investment."'" At UBS
Warburg, positive recommendations were issued by an analyst on
Interspeed, which was one of the firm's investment banking clients, but
47. The SEC's on-site examination of nine full secure brokerage firms found that in
26 of 97 lock-ups reviewed, research analysts may have issued "booster shot" research
reports. Testimony of Laura S. Unger, supra note 35. See generally Orcutt, supra note
26, at 25.
48. Ten of Nation's Top Investment Firms Settle Enforcement Actions Involving
Conflicts of Interest Between Research and Investment Banking (Apr. 28, 2003),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-54.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2006)
(declaring that Bear Steams, Credit Suisse, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, J.P.
Morgan, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Salomon, UBS Warburg and Piper Jaffray all
agreed to substantial penalties and disgorgement of profits); Deutsche Bank Securities
Inc. and Thomas Weisel Partners LLC Settle Enforcement Actions Involving Conflicts
of Interest Between Research and Investment Banking (Aug. 26, 2004), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press2004-120.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2006).
49. E.g., Roel Campos, Comment & Analysis: Let Issuers Pay for Analysts'
Research, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2002 at 21 (stating that recent disclosures suggest that
for years analysts' research has been improperly influenced by pressure to issue positive
research to attract underwriting and investment banking business).
50. Hearing on Corporate Governance Before the U.S. Senate Comm. On
Commerce, Science and Tech., Sub-Comm. On Consumer Affairs, Foreign Commerce
and Tourism, 107th Cong., (June 26, 2002) (testimony of Eliot Spitzer, N.Y. Att'y
Gen.), available at http://www.commerce.senate.gov/hearings/062602spitzer.pdf.
51. Id.
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privately the analyst stated that the stock should be shorted.1 At
Salomon Smith Barney, analyst Grubman reiterated a "buy"
recommendation in February 2001 on Focal, an investment banking
client, and a target price of $30 (twice the stock price). The same day,
an institutional investor e-mailed a research analyst who worked for
Grubman, "McLeod [McLeod USA Inc.] and Focal are pigs aren't
they?" and asked whether Focal was a short. The analyst responded,
"Focal definitely... ,53 In April 2001, Grubman stated privately the
need to downgrade Focal, but nevertheless once again advised investors
to buy Focal.54 At Credit Suisse, Digital Impact received a "buy" or
"strong buy" rating from January 2000 to April 2001, even while the
stock price declined from $50 to less than $2. 5  In May through
September 2001, a new analyst stated privately he wanted to drop
coverage on the company because of its difficult market environment.
However, he did not drop coverage due to pressure from investment
bankers, and left the buy rating unchanged until October 2001.56 At
Bear Steams, Micromuse, Inc. received a "buy" rating while an analyst
of the firm privately characterized the stock as "dead money. 5 7 At
Lehman Brothers, an analyst who covered RSL Communications, Inc.
stated privately, "I have attempted to downgrade RSLC THREE times
over the last year, but have been held off for banking reasons each
time.,58  At Deutsche Bank Securities, an analyst issued positive
recommendations on Oracle but privately expressed the view to a large
institutional investor that the stock should be sold.5 9 Similarly, an
52. SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets Inc., SEC Litigation Release No. 18111,
(Apr. 28, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lrl 8111.htm.
53. U.B.S. Warburg, LLC., SEC Litigation Release No. 18112, 2003 SEC LEXIS
1008 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2003).
54. Id. In April 2001, Grubman expressed the need to downgrade six telecom
companies. Investment bankers pressured Grubman not to downgrade the companies,
and he did not. He continued to advise investors to buy the stocks.
55. SEC v. Credit Suisse First Boston, SEC Litigation Release No. 18110, (Apr.
28, 2003) available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/Irl 811 0.htm.
56. Id.
57. SEC v. Bear, Steams & Co. Inc., SEC Litigation Release No. 18109, (Apr. 28,
2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18109/htm.
58. SEC v. Lehman Brothers Inc., SEC Litigation Release No. 18116, (Apr. 28,
2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/r 18116/htm.
59. SEC v. Deutsche Bank Securities Inc., SEC Litigation Release No. 18854,
(Apr. 26, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lrl8854.htm.
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analyst issued a "market perform" rating on Eprise Corporation while
privately referring to the company as "permanent toast., 60
The persistence of an industry-wide culture of ignoring the federal
antifraud law's underlying purpose is witnessed in reactions and
responses to the global settlement reached with the SEC. Statements
made soon after the settlement were to the effect that the securities firms
had done nothing that should be of concern to their clients.61  This
reaction received a rebuke from the SEC.
Similarly, actions taken soon after the settlement also evidence a
culture of ignoring the law's purposes and perhaps its literal
requirements. The settlement prohibited analysts from engaging in
marketing or selling efforts to investors with respect to investment
banking transactions. Yet Bear Stearns distributed to clients an intemet
"roadshow" broadcast in which one of its senior analysts glowingly
touted iPayment Inc., a company Bear Stearns was taking public.62 In
addition, Bear Stearns, Citigroup and other investment banks distributed
analysts' revenue and earnings estimates for companies whose initial
public offerings they were underwriting.63 In the latter case, the firms
claimed analysts could, under the settlement, prepare internal use
memoranda and participate in efforts to educate the sales force. Yet, the
reports were being distributed to investors, and the settlement also stated
that firms could not do indirectly what they are barred from doing
directly.64
D. Conclusion
A vague statutory standard was not determinative of analyst
conduct in the securities industry. The purpose behind the legal standard
was ignored and, at times, the legal standard itself was violated by many
members of the industry.
These findings contradict the assumption in the Principles of
Corporate Governance that the law determines corporate conduct. What
60. Id.
61. See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
62. Ann Davis & Randall Smith, Deals & Deal Makers: Investment Bankers
Wrangle Over Gray Areas In Pact On IPOs, WALL ST. J., May 23, 2003, at C5.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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is leading corporate actors to evade or ignore legal mandates? This issue
is explored in Part Three of this article.
PART THREE - RECOGNIZING AND EMBRACING COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
Law commonly takes the form of a vague standard, whether a
common law standard or a statutory standard. Law also frequently
employs a disclosure standard. However, it is not the legal mandate
itself but the interaction of many influences that is determining corporate
conduct. These various influences can be described as costs of
compliance/noncompliance, benefits of compliance/noncompliance, or
the means to evaluate whether the costs exceed the benefits.
Thus, cost-benefit evaluations are not to be ignored, as demanded
by the Principles of Corporate Governance, but need to be studied in
order to make law a more effective influence on corporate behavior.
Part Three of this article explores this issue by examining the role of
cost-benefit evaluations in the law and in corporate decision making.
A. Cost-Benefit Evaluations in Corporate Decisions on Legal
Compliance
The law and economics literature has, at times, suggested that cost-
benefit analysis is relevant in determining whether corporate actors
acted reasonably in discharging their legal obligations, with legal
sanctions treated as prices for noncompliance. 65 This approach has been
criticized, largely on normative grounds.66 The Principles of Corporate
Governance accepts the latter position as a normative principle and as a
mandatory principle of conduct. It takes the position that the law does
65. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of Tender
Offers, 80 MICH. L. REv. 1155, 1168 n.36, 1177 n.57 (1982); Stephen L. Pepper,
Counseling at the Limits of the Law: An Exercise in the Jurisprudence and Ethics of
Lawyering, 104 YALE L.J. 1545, 1576-77 (1995).
66. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Litigation and Corporate Governance: An Essay on
Steering Between Scylla and Charybdis, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 789, 794 n. 11, 798
(1984); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REv.
1253, 1272-73 (1999) (stating that an economic approach would significantly diminish
the force of the otherwise existing social norms, such as truth-telling); Robert Cooter,
Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1523, 1543 (1984) (finding that economists
sometimes think of sanctions as prices, which prevents them from understanding the
normative character of law).
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not permit cost-benefit analysis to play a role in corporate decisions
regarding legal compliance.67 However, this view ignores that the nature
of most legal regimes invites cost-benefit evaluations.
The position embraced by the Principles of Corporate Governance
presumes that the legal mandate - i.e., when response is required and
what response is required - is clear. Many legal regimes are
characterized by vague legal standards. When this is the case, the
corporation must assess whether its actions are in violation of a
governing legal standard, and, if so, what response is required. Both
assessments are being made in an environment of uncertainty regarding
the legal mandate. Added to this uncertainty, at times, is additional
uncertainty regarding the likelihood and type of sanction if the
corporation is deemed to be in noncompliance. In choosing to define the
legal mandate broadly, which would best serve the law's purpose, or
narrowly, which would avoid changing current corporate practices that
are profitable, cost-benefit analysis inevitably influences the
corporation's assessment.
B. Evasion of Law As A Reasonable Decision
1. Decision Making in a Cost-Benefit Context
Existing studies of organizational behavior have found that both
legal and non-legal factors influence corporate decisions. Factors
exerting an influence, 68 although not necessarily a determinative
influence, include concern over community reputation, community
pressure and publicity. These are influences based, in part, on social
norms. Other factors exerting an influence are competitive pressures
and reputation among peers. These are influences based, in part, on
industry norms. Other influences on corporate behavior are assessments
of costs of compliance and financial capabilities. Finally, the factors
exerting an influence on corporate decisions include legal regimes. This
encompasses not only the law's mandate, which was examined in Part
Two of this article, but also enforcement measures, such as inspection
67. ALI, supra note 10.
68. Supra notes 20-21.
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frequency and type of sanction.
All of these influences, including the type of legal mandate
imposed, can be best understood as interacting in the context of a cost-
benefit evaluation. Some influences are costs or benefits of compliance.
These include direct costs of compliance, competitive pressures, severity
of legal sanctions and publicity (either favorable or unfavorable). Other
influences are upon internal evaluation of costs and benefits. This
includes the type of legal mandate. For example, a vague legal mandate
permits reasonable denial of noncompliance and influences the
assessment of likelihood of sanctions. Factors influencing corporate
evaluations also include factors affecting evaluations of risk, such as
inspection frequency and likelihood of imposition of sanctions based on
past practices. Finally, they include factors that help the corporate actor
weigh costs versus benefits and arrive at a decision regarding corporate
behavior. These include industry norms and community pressures.
Thus, all influences uncovered in past studies and in the case studies in
this article are best understood when they are viewed in the context of
the overall approach taken by corporate actors to decision making.
Namely, they are best understood not when studied individually but
when studied as components of an interacting group of influences all of
which play a role in corporate cost-benefit evaluations.
How does complexity, namely the synergistic interaction of distinct
influences, affect this viewpoint? Existing studies have largely taken a
reductionist view of individual influences. They have sought the one or
several influences that alone or in conjunction determine corporate
conduct. However, complexity theory forces us to recognize that human
behavior results from the interaction of many influences, with the role
played by individual influences varying in differing contexts and the
synergy produced by the interaction of influences leading to
unpredictable outcomes.69
This is not to say, however, that we cannot draw conclusions
regarding frequently recurring outcomes to test general propositions.
Examination of market outcomes allows us to see results produced after
the interaction of a variety of influences. Such market outcomes were
examined in the case studies in Part Two. What recurring conclusions
were witnessed? First, the law's mandate was not determinative of
corporate behavior. This reflects the weak influence of social norms,
69. NICOLIS & PRIGOGINE, supra note 3.
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not only the general norm of compliance with law, but also specific
social norms reflected in the specific purposes behind the mandates
studied in Part Two.7" Second, a variety of other influences that
individually or in conjunction might lead to legal compliance, such as
reputational concerns, publicity, and community pressure, in fact did not
typically engender legal compliance. All of these influences, or fears of
them, existed in the case study in this article, yet none led to
commitment to legal compliance. This has implications for free market
proponents.7 Non-legal influences, such as reputational concerns or
competitive pressures, did not lead to a strong commitment to the law's
mandate or its underlying purpose even when such purpose reflects
accepted social norms. Thus, the free market viewpoint that inspection
and enforcement measures are unnecessary, or that a legal signal (a legal
regime) is itself unnecessary, is discredited in the case studies in Part
Two.
How then can organizational behavior be changed so as to embrace
a greater commitment to legal compliance? The position in this article is
that recognizing corporate cost-benefit evaluations and incorporating
such evaluations into legal regimes would achieve this result. The
means to accomplish this result while embracing complexity theory and
evidence of complexity in organizational behavior is discussed section
C, below.
However, this article first examines the role played by
psychological influences on organizational behavior, their effects on
evaluations of risks and benefits, and the reason such influences lead to
lack of commitment to legal compliance in many legal regimes that have
been utilized. It then explores an alternative legal regime that exerts
greater influence on corporate behavior.
70. The legal mandate discussed in this article reflects social norms that direct
members of our society to avoid taking financial advantages of others who may not be
able to protect themselves (e.g., the securities industry case study).
71. See discussion, supra note 20.
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2. Psychological Influences on Evaluation of Risks
Denial As A Behavioral Tendency
Two types of behavioral tendencies lead corporate actors to choose
to evade legal mandates and purposes when commitment to compliance
undermines maximization of profits.72 The first behavioral tendency is
denial. This includes denial of responsibility or fault, which undermines
the potential influence of the social norm of conformity with law. For
the individual, corporate structures allow individuals to deny personal
moral responsibility for corporate actions by claiming they are merely
agents rather than decision makers. 73  Given the large number of
individuals involved in corporate decisions, as well as the inherent
nature of the corporate structure in which all directors and senior
officers are merely agents for shareholders, corporate structures permit
denial of responsibility even among senior level executives and
corporate directors.
For the corporation as an entity, the denial of responsibility or fault
takes various forms. First, there is a denial of legal noncompliance.
Given the vague nature of most legal mandates, such denial is almost
always an option. Neither the legal mandate nor the required course of
action is clear, and, therefore, denial of noncompliance becomes a
prevailing practice.74
In the securities industry, members strongly denied any wrongdoing
when charges were brought by regulators based on securities analysts'
conduct. Merrill Lynch, for example, stated it always had procedures in
place to protect the independence of research analysts and claimed that
evidence uncovered by the New York State Attorney General merely
"may have appeared" inconsistent with Merrill Lynch's published
recommendation.7" Morgan Stanley's CEO stated, "I don't see anything
72. Dennis Fox, The Law Says Corporations Are Persons, but Psychology Knows
Better, 14 BEHAV. Scl. & L. 339, 348-49 (1996).
73. Id.
74. See Smith, supra note 2, at 1300 (noting the ambiguity of rules created through
statutory and judicial means).
75. Press Release, Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc., Merrill Lynch Announces Agreement
With New York State Attorney General (May 21, 2002) (on file with author); Press
Release, Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc., Merrill Lynch Statement on Action by N.Y.
Attorney General (Apr. 5, 2002).
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in the settlement that will concern the retail investor about Morgan
Stanley., 76 He received a strong rebuke from SEC Chairman Donaldson
and then apologized for the remark.77 Similarly, Citigroup claimed that
changes it had agreed to in its settlement were merely aimed to ensure
that the firm "adhere to the new standards that are emerging. 78 In other
words, past actions fully complied with standards traditionally imposed
but were criticized only due to the emergence of new standards. Merrill
Lynch's CEO wrote an editorial in the Wall Street Journal in which he
stated:
Risk-taking is essential to capitalism. Without it, the system can't
function .... Of course, in any system predicated on risk-taking,
there are failures, sometimes spectacular failures. But for every
failure to be viewed as fraudulent or even criminal bodes ill for our
economic system. The message to CEOs, to entrepreneurs and to
venture capitalists right now is that you cannot afford to be wrong.79
In other words, there was no wrongdoing - only losses resulting
from normal investment risks. Both responses evidence denial of
noncompliance as one level of corporate response.
A second form of denial is denial of responsibility for outcomes.
At times, this takes the form of shifting blame to external forces such as
market conditions. The securities industry case study provides such an
example, with investors' losses blamed on the decline in the value of
telecommunications stocks and not on the misleading analyst
recommendations.8"
76. U.S. SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, THE IMPACT
OF THE GLOBAL SETTLEMENT (2003), available at http://banking.senate.gov/
index.cfm?Fuseaction=Hearings.Testimony&TestimonylD= 177&HearinglD= 28.
77. 35 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 789 (May 13, 2003).
78. CITIGROuP, BusINEss PRACTICES PROGRESS REPORT (Aug. 7, 2002),
http://www.citigroup.com/citigroup/press/ citigroup2002.htm.
79. Stan O'Neal, Risky Business, WALL ST. J., Apr. 24, 2003, at A16 (discussing
that Citigroup blamed investors' losses on a collapse in the telecommunications sector
and not on the quality of Jack Grubman's stock recommendations). Citigroup, Telecom
Analyst Jack Grubman to Leave Salomon Smith Barney (Aug. 15, 2002),
http://www.citigroup.com/citigroup/press/citigroup2002.htm.
80. Id.
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Decision Making Heuristics
The second type of behavioral tendency that leads corporate actors
to evade legal mandates and purposes is resorting to decision making
heuristics that exaggerate benefits and minimize risks of noncompliance.
For the purposes of this article, the most relevant heuristic devices
witnessed that minimize risks of noncompliance are skewed risk
perception, simplified decision making strategy and omission bias. The
most relevant heuristic devices witnessed that exaggerate benefits of
noncompliance are the endowment effect and combined loss
aversion/risk aversion.
Skewed risk perception is the inverse relationship found in
individuals' perceptions of risks versus benefits. When a high benefit is
perceived (e.g., high profits produced by a course of action), then any
risk posed by the activity is viewed as a low risk, whereas when a low
benefit is perceived, then any risk posed by the activity is viewed as a
high risk. This is regardless of the actual objective level of risk that a
disinterested third party would perceive.81
Simplified decision making strategy is a response to complexity
when individuals are faced with a number of interacting variables and
uncertainty in expected future outcomes. Such complexity (e.g.,
determining the adverse profit consequences of a change in product
design, or the probability of exposure to legal liability when liability is
based on numerous, vague prerequisites to recovery) is beyond human
cognitive ability to process. As a result, individuals resort to a
simplified decision making strategy. They typically give the highest
value to the choice that is most important to the decision maker,83 (e.g.,
preserving high profits). In addition, they typically ignore risks that are
viewed as low probability risks84 (e.g., successful private lawsuits where
a cause of action is difficult to prove).
81. See CASS R. SJNSTErN, RISK AND REASON 40-41 (2002).
82. See Russell B. Korobkin and Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science:
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1051,
1077 (2000).
83. Id. at 1077-78 (showing research involving decision making by consumers);
See also Charles Yablon, The Meaning of Probability Judgments: An Essay On the Use
and Misuse of Behavioral Economics, 2004 U. ILL. L. REv. 102-03, 110-13 (discussing
the subjective nature of probability judgments).
84. Robert Prentice, Chicago Man, K-T Man, and The Future of Behavioral Law
and Economics, 56 VAND. L. REv. 1663, 1758 (2003).
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Omission bias, sometimes referred to as regret theory, refers to the
finding that individuals regret adverse consequences stemming from
their actions more than adverse consequences stemming from inaction.85
Thus, risks from maintaining the status quo (e.g., risk of exposure to
liability) are minimized while risks of changing the status quo (e.g., loss
of profits) are exaggerated.
Turning to the perception of benefits of noncompliance, the
endowment effect is a finding that individuals place greater value on
what they already own than on what benefit they might receive from a
future change in conduct.86  This is related to risk aversion. Risk
aversion is a finding that individuals are averse to expected gains from a
change in a course of action. They prefer greater certainty when the
benefit is a proposed future gain as opposed to the predicted gain from
maintaining the status quo.87 Loss aversion is a finding that individuals
fear losses, indeed they fear losses roughly twice as much as they enjoygains.8 The result of these three heuristics is that benefits of
maintaining the status quo, which evidences a low commitment to legal
compliance, are exaggerated. The obvious benefit sought to be
preserved is high profits from the current corporate course of conduct.
At the same time, a change in course of conduct is resisted in part
because gains are uncertain.
Many of the psychological studies exploring human decision
making have been conducted on individuals, responding as individuals.89
However, further studies have found no differences in uses of decision
making heuristics in group decision making, such as may exist in an
organizational setting.90
These decision making heuristics are evidenced in the conduct of
corporate actors. This evidence is explored below.
85. Id. at 1700, 1760.
86. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 82, at 1107-08; Prentice, supra note 84, at 1674-
75, 1700.
87. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 82, at 1104.
88. Prentice, supra note 84, at 1674; SUNSTEIN, supra note 81, at 42.
89. Prentice, supra note 84, at 1714.
90. Id.
790 FORDHAMJOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. XI
FINANCIAL LA W
Citigroup's Reasonable Response to the Risk of Civil Penalties and
Lawsuits Seeking Damages
Citigroup's cost associated with a strong commitment to
compliance with federal securities regulations governing analysts'
conduct would be the loss of investment banking fees and brokerage
commissions produced by trading in recommended shares. Court
documents reveal the investment banking fees earned by Salomon Smith
Barney due to specific technology stocks for which its top
telecommunications analyst, Jack Grubman, provided misleading buy
recommendations. These commissions exceeded $1 billion in the years
1998 through 2001.91 This was the revenue produced by wrongdoing on
the part of only one analyst. Moreover, it does not include brokerage
commissions earned due to trading in the stocks in question. Thus, the
overall benefit of noncompliance to Citigroup was significantly more
than $1 billion. Indeed, Citigroup's head of equity research saw a threat
to $16 billion in fees. What were the risks of noncompliance?
The perceived legal risks were the imposition of sanctions by the
SEC and, possibly, awards of damages in lawsuits brought by investors.
At the time of the wrongdoing both risks were low probability risks.
Conflicts of interest faced by securities analysts had existed
industry wide for many years and had not been challenged by
regulators.92 If actions had been taken, the cost was predicted to be
small. Prior to the SEC's fine levied against the bankrupt WorldCom
91. Complaint at 51, New York v. Anschultz, available at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/sep/sep30c 02 complaint.pdf (summarizing
investment banking revenues produced by Grubman in the telecommunications sector,
for which he served as an analyst, in 1998-2001); Assurance of Discontinuance at 32,
In the Matter of Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., http://www.oag.state.ny.us/investors/
citigroup/citigroupaod.pdf (summarizing same for 1999-2001). These fees totaled:
1998 $ 255,735,000
1999 $ 359,189,000
2000 $ 331,142,000
2001 $ 101,000,000
$1,047,066,000
92. J. ROBERT BROWN, THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE DISCLOSURE § 8.04 (3d
ed. 1998) (The SEC has occasionally brought enforcement actions directly against
analysts for violations of the securities laws. Most involved analysts who
misappropriated information and tipped it to others. No cases involved analysts qua
analysts). See also Fisch & Sale, supra note 26, at 1061 ("after... 1991 ... the SEC
stopped bringing selective disclosure actions based on [§] 10(b)").
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Inc., the SEC's biggest fine against an operating company had been just
$10 million.93
Private lawsuits alleging securities law violations against analysts
were viewed as difficult to prove and, therefore, unlikely to be
successful. 94  The difficulty lies in proving all of the elements for
recovery, including scienter and causation.95 Each of these elements
may be justified in isolation,96 but they lead to the conclusion that risk of
liability is a low probability risk and, therefore, can be ignored or
assumed when the firm is faced with large profits from a particular
course of conduct. Indeed, the experience of plaintiffs' attorneys in
lawsuits later filed based on misleading securities analysts reports have
confirmed the assessment that few can be successful. 97
93. Deborah Solomon, As Corporate Fines Grow, SEC Debates How Much Good
They Do, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 2004, at Al.
94. David J. Labhart, Securities Analysts: Why These Gatekeepers Abandoned
Their Post, 79 IND. L.J. 1037, 1041-44 (2004) (discussing heightened pleading
requirements imposed by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, as well
as requirements such as false statements of fact (rather than opinion), scienter, and
proximate cause); Fisch & Sale, supra note 26, at 1057-58 (finding that suits against
analysts alleging fraud have been rare). See also John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding
Enron: "Its About the Gatekeepers, Stupid," 57 Bus. LAW. 1403, 1409-10, nn.29-32
(2002) (discussing decreased risks of lawsuits in the 1990s against gatekeepers, such as
auditors, based on legislative enactments and Supreme Court decisions decreasing the
statute of limitations applicable to securities fraud and eliminating private "aiding and
abetting" liability).
95. See Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2005) (dismissing
investors' lawsuit against securities firm and its research analyst for failure to
adequately plead that conflicts of interest and misrepresentations by the research analyst
caused their financial loss).
96. See Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 125 S. Ct. 1627 (2005) (stating that
the securities law seeks to protect investors against those economic losses that
misrepresentations actually cause and the statute imposes the burden of proving loss
causation on the plaintiffs).
97. Susanne Craig, Lawsuits Seeking to Cash In Amid the $1.4 billion Accord
Mostly Have Garnered Nothing, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 2005, at C1. Securities industry
arbitration panels have rejected the vast majority of cases decided thus far. Most of the
arbitration cases from the stock research settlement have been filed by Richard Lott's
firm and another pair of lawyers, James Hooper and Robert Weiss. Mr. Lott filed about
300 cases against Merrill Lynch and has lost all 25 cases that have completed the
process. Messrs. Hooper and Weiss filed 800 cases against Citigroup and they have
won just 37 cases and lost 97). Id.
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In 2003, Citigroup settled with the SEC and state securities
regulators by agreeing to pay $400 million in monetary sanctions, which
included $150 million as a penalty. 98 This sanction was unexpected.99
Some lawsuits brought by investors have yielded large recoveries. For
example, a settlement of a class action lawsuit by investors in
WorldCom, Inc., which focused in part on misleading ratings by
telecommunications analyst Jack Grubman, was for the sum of $2.65
billion,'00 or $1.64 billion after tax.'0 ' However, this was an unusually
large settlement. Previous large settlements in securities class action
cases have been in the hundreds of millions of dollars. 02  Citigroup's
settlement with investors over the collapse of Global Crossing was for
the sum of $75 million, or $46 million after tax. 0 3 Both the size of the
98. SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., Civ. Action No. 03 Civ. 2945
(S.D.N.Y. 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/judge 18111 .pdf
(including $150 million as a penalty, $150 million as disgorgement of commissions and
other monies, $75 million for procurement of independent research, and $25 million for
investor education). This is the largest settlement against the 10 firms subject to the
global research analyst settlement; see also Order Approving Settlements and Entering
Final Judgments, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/globalsettlement/appnewinvedplan.pdf.
Part of the settlement is tax deductible for the firms. SEC Chairman Donaldson
clarified that the $387.5 million disgorgement amount in the $1.4 billion dollar
settlement probably can be deducted as well as independent research and investor
education models. Senator Dodd estimated that only about one third of the settlement is
a penalty on which the firms will not get a tax deduction or insurance coverage. Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA), May 12, 2003, at 790. Citigroup hopes to recover at least part
of its share of the settlement from its insurer; Patrick McGeehan, Wall St. Firms Want
Insurers to Cover Fines, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2003, at C1 (apart from recovery of some
of the costs of the settlement with regulations, restitution money to investors, like
damages awarded in court, can be recovered under certain types of insurance policies).
99. See generally Gretchen Morgenson, Accord Highlights Wall St. Failures, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 20, 2002, at Cl. The settlement and investigation that let up to it show a
serious breakdown in self-policing by the brokerage firms, and how regulators fell
down on their jobs during the stock surge of the late 1990s. The SEC seemed
unconcerned about tainted analysis. It took New York Attorney General Spitzer to
spotlight the issue.
100. Mitchell Pacelle, Citigroup Will Pay $2.65 billion to Settle WorldCom Investor
Suit, WALL ST. J., May 11, 2004, at Al.
101. Citigroup Settles Round 2, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2004, at A22
102. Kara Scannell & Mitchell Pacelle, Wall Street Gets Sticker Shock from
Citigroup, WALL ST. J., May 12, 2004, at C1.
103. Global Crossing Investors Settle with Citigroup, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2005, at
C2. See also Susan Harrigan, Citigroup Settles for $75M, NEWSDAY, Mar. 3, 2005, at
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WorldCom settlement and Citigroup's possible exposure to liability was
unexpected before the fact.
In hindsight, Citigroup's decision not to strongly commit to legal
compliance could be viewed as an unreasonable decision. Losses from
noncompliance have been substantial. However, this is an assessment
made in hindsight. At the time the decisions were made, they could be
viewed as reasonable decisions made in light of cost-benefit evaluations.
At the time, risks of noncompliance were low probability risks.
Moreover, when the WorldCom settlement is viewed as an atypically
large settlement, Citigroup's decision may not even be clearly
unreasonable. Apart from the WorldCom settlement, when all lawsuits
involving misleading analyst statements are settled, revenue benefits of
noncompliance may still exceed costs of noncompliance.
Finally, it is not even clear that the large fine and settlement due to
analyst activities would itself alter industry conduct in future activities.
There have been one-time, large settlements in the past,1°4 yet they did
not alter industry commitment to legal mandates and their purposes, as
evidenced by conduct in recent years. Perhaps each large settlement is
viewed as a unique occurrence, and each factual setting in which fraud is
alleged is viewed as a unique factual context.
As discussed above in the Citigroup example, at the time corporate
decisions were made the actual risks of noncompliance could be viewed
as low probability using an objective measure of risk. Moreover, when
skewed risk perception is introduced as a decision making heuristic, the
assessment of probability drops even further. This is because the high
benefit produced, in the form of billions of dollars in revenues, further
diminishes the assessed probability of risk. Simplified decision making
A46 ($75 million is "about one day's worth of free cash flow" for Citigroup says
analyst Richard Bove).
104. See Gretchen Morgenson, Corporate Conduct; News Analysis; Accord
Highlights Wall St. Failures, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2002, at Cl (reporting fines paid by
investment companies related to bad investment advice including: Prudential Securities,
1993-95, $1.5 billion paid in fines and restitution to investors who lost money in risky
limited partnerships; Nasdaq and 30 securities firms, 1996-97, $1 billion paid to settle
claims of price fixing in trading of Nasdaq stocks; Drexel Burnham Lambert, 1988,
$650 million paid for trading on inside information; Merrill Lynch, 1997-98, $470
million paid to settle lawsuits alleging the firm provided bad investment advice that
pushed Orange County into bankruptcy; Salomon Brothers, 1992, $290 million paid for
submitting fake bids to buy Treasury securities).
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strategy confirmed this conclusion with regard to investor lawsuits.
Such suits required proof of numerous legal prerequisites for recovery,
including intent, reliance, and causation.'15 As a result, processing
probable outcomes was beyond human cognitive ability. Using
simplified decision making strategy, the highest value is given to the
outcome that is most important to the decision maker - e.g., preserving
existing high revenues - while low probability risks are ignored.'0 6
This approach, combined with omission bias, also skews decisions
in favor of maintaining the status quo rather than actively committing
the firm to greater commitment to legal compliance. The actual adverse
impact on revenues of modifying analysts' research reports and
recommendations is unknown and unknowable. However, risk of
changing the status quo (e.g., loss of revenues) is exaggerated in the
mind of the decision maker. The endowment effect and loss aversion
serves to confirm the conclusion that noncompliance is a wise course of
action in the mind of the corporate decision maker, because existing,
high profits from current conduct (the status quo) are most important to
that decision maker.
Overall, the law's vague mandate to the securities industry - to
avoid fraudulent conduct - generates denial rather than compliance. In
addition, cost-benefit evaluations made in light of behavioral heuristics
lead to the conclusion that evasion, rather than commitment to the law
and its purposes, is the reasonable course of conduct.
C. An Alternative Regime: Market-Based Sanctions as a Strange
Attractor
The evidence presented in this article leads to the conclusion that
the law must overcome three substantial barriers regarding legal
compliance. First, industry norms must be overcome. Part Two of this
article documented prevailing industry practices - practices seeking to
avoid or evade compliance with law when it will adversely affect
corporate profits. In the securities industry case study, regulators
eventually took action to stop misleading statements due to analyst
conflicts of interest that were no secret in the securities industry and had
105. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIEs REGULATION § 13.2.1 (3d ed.
1996) (discussing the development, use, success and elements of Rule 1 Ob-5 cases).
106. See Prentice, supra note 84, at 1758.
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existed for decades.
10 7
Second, the behavioral tendency to deny responsibility and fault
must be overcome. One conclusion that can be drawn from the case
studies is that greater certainty in the law is one approach to overcoming
denial of responsibility. Yet there are significant limitations to relying
solely on this approach. First, it addresses only one form of denial -
denial of noncompliance. It does not address the other denial strategies
- e.g., denial of responsibility.10 8 Second, in many situations certainty
in the legal mandate - i.e., certainty in the required course of conduct
for corporate actors - is a difficult or infeasible option. For example,
what precise disclosures of risks or likelihood of benefits would be
imposed on all securities analysts in all future research reports?
Certainty in proscribed courses of conduct is often not a practical, and at
times not even a possible, alternative. In addition, at times certainty in
proscribed conduct is counterproductive, in that corporations, faced with
continuing pressure to maximize profits, search for and exploit
loopholes in the proscribed standard.'0 9 Thus, more is needed. What is
needed is a legal regime that motivates corporate actors to commit to
legal compliance rather than to seek ways to avoid or evade the law.
This requires overcoming industry norms, behavioral tendencies of
denial, and decision making heuristics that currently favor maintaining
strategies that evade the law even in the face of potential or actual
sanctions.
The alternative proposed is one that uses industry norms and
107. See Richard Perez-Pena & Patrick McGeehan, Assault on Wall St. Misdeeds
Raises Spitzer's U.S. Profile, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2002, at B6; see also Gretchen
Morgenson, Requiem for an Honorable Profession, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2002, § 3 at 1
(stating that interviews with former analysts at a variety of firms provide evidence that
in recent years analysts were driven not to provide the best advice for investors but to
generate investment banking fees).
108. See discussion, supra note 80 and accompanying text.
109. E.g., Julie Claire Diop, Young Workers Easily Cheated by Some Firms, THE
BALTIMORE SuN, Apr. 4, 2004, at 5D (stating that one way unscrupulous companies
cheat younger workers is by wrongly classifying them as interns or contract employees,
which don't count as employees subject to the Fair Labor Standards Act's provisions on
wages); Steven Greenhouse, Middlemen in the Low- Wage Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
28, 2003, Week in Review at 10 (noting that, after federal agents raided 60 Wal-Mart
stores, the company claimed it did not know that labor contractors for the firm hired
illegal immigrants or cut corners by not paying overtime and social security taxes).
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decision making heuristics in a manner that compels greater
commitment to legal compliance. The proposal is one that embraces the
corporate strategy of employing cost-benefit evaluations in making
decisions on legal compliance but skews evaluations in such a manner
that benefits of compliance outweigh costs of noncompliance more often
than under current legal regimes.
The proposal relies on market-based sanctions, as opposed to the
sanctions of injunctive relief, fines or recovery of damages that are
typically relied upon currently. The proposal is best understood by first
examining complexity theory's concept of strange attractors.
Complexity theory recognizes that human behavior results from the
interaction of many factors and, therefore, precise outcomes are
unpredictable. However, such outcomes are not chaotic. Rather, there
is an outer boundary that constrains outcomes. Precise outcomes can
fall anywhere within the outer boundary. Such boundary, or strange
attractor, can be the result of self-organization,"0 or it can be externally
imposed. 1"
The Principles of Corporate Governance assume that the law acts
as the outer boundary for corporate ethical behavior. "2 Thus, actual
conduct will vary from firm to firm but conduct will always fall within
the outer boundary which is the legal mandate applicable to a particular
situation. Schematically, this can be represented as follows:
110. See generally ILYA PRIGOGINE & ISABELLE STENGERS, ORDER OUT OF CHAOS
141-42 (1984) (concluding that nature searches for a new order after the onset of
turbulence).
111. See JACK COHEN & IAN STEWART, THE COLLAPSE OF CHAOS 396-99 (1994)
(finding that strange attractors are the organizing constraint to the seemingly chaotic
nature of change).
112. See ALI, supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
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Universe of Actual
However, the case studies in Part Two of this article demonstrate
that this is not the case, particularly when the legal mandate is vague.
Law serves as only one influence on corporate behavior, but it is not
determinative of corporate behavior. Thus, in reality, law and other
influences become self-organizing influences to form an outer boundary
to corporate behavior, but the boundary is not equivalent to the legal
mandate. Schematically, actual corporate conduct under currently
prevailing legal regimes can be represented as follows:
Strange Attractor
(Outer Boundary: The
Interaction of All
Influences on
Corporate Behavior
The Legal
Mandate
Universe of Actual
Outcomes
The challenge is to draw the actual strange attractor (outer
boundary) to corporate behavior, as evidenced by actual outcomes in the
market, closer to the legal mandate. The alternative legal regime I
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propose is a greater use of market-based sanctions.
Experience in the banking industry with the Community
Reinvestment Act (CRA) provides support for this alternative. The
proposal is to rely on loss of market share as a sanction for
noncompliance with law. This sanction can be combined with a clear
legal mandate, or it can be combined with a vague legal mandate, as it
has been in the CRA experience. Thus, continued use of vague legal
standards becomes a possibility without sacrificing corporate
commitment to compliance.
Citigroup's response to a variety of charges of violations of law
also illustrates the effectiveness of market-based sanctions. In recent
years, Citigroup faced a number of scandals involving violations of law,
including misleading reports issued by securities analysts, mutual fund
abuses, and aiding fraud committed by clients such as Enron.113 Yet a
strong commitment to legal compliance emerged only after Japanese
authorities shut down its private bank operations and banned Citigroup
from participating in its government bond auctions.
14
After these actions on the part of Japanese authorities, as well as the
possibility that European government officials would forgo choosing
Citigroup to underwrite international bond offerings because of ethical
lapses in Europe, the cost-benefit evaluation changed dramatically for
Citigroup. 15 Lost business and market share was no longer a cost of
compliance but instead a cost of noncompliance. Once again,
113. Mara Der Hovanesian & Paula Dwyer, Can Chuck Prince Clean Up Citi?,
Bus. WK., Oct. 4, 2004, at 32.
114. Id. (CEO Prince has now begun to overhaul the risk and compliance hierarchy
in New York, establish a set of compliance reports to be sent to the audit committee of
Citi's board, establish a Policy Compliance Assessment Group, and mandate ethics
training for all employees); Mitchell Pacelle, Martin Fackler & Andrew Morse, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 22, 2004, at Al (CEO Prince is now acknowledging that he and his
colleagues were too focused on the bottom line, and in a series of sweeping moves he
has beefed up compliance and sent a message that top managers could be held
accountable for regulatory lapses anywhere in their domain). In addition to the market
based response of Japanese authorities, Citigroup has angered governmental authorities
in England, Belgium and Italy which often give Citi lucrative contracts to handle their
international bond offerings. DeHovanisian and Dwyer, supra note 113.
115. DeHovanisian and Dwyer, supra note 113, at 32 (In a Sept. 20 report, in which
he downgraded the bank's shares to neutral from buy, Merrill Lynch & Co. banking
analyst Guy Moszkowski charged that Citi's "aggressive profit incentives [are]
overriding judgment").
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noncompliance was no longer a reasonable corporate decision.
Self-regulatory agencies and the SEC are exploring greater use of a
form of market-based sanction, by imposing business line suspensions,
such as five-day suspensions for registrations of brokers, on securities
firms charged with regulatory wrongdoing." 6 This article urges greater
use of market-based sanctions.
The Community Reinvestment Act' 17 offers a model of a legislative
scheme that completely alters corporate cost-benefit evaluations and
leads to heightened commitment to compliance with law. The statutory
mandate is a vague one - namely, a financial institution must meet "the
credit needs of its entire community, including low- and moderate-
income neighborhoods, consistent with the safe and sound operation of
such institution ... The regulations implementing the Act did little
to clarify the financial institution's obligation. There was no required
level of commitment and no stipulated activities or course of conduct.' 19
The corporation itself was asked to determine what specific action and
what level of commitment would meet the statutory mandate. Indeed,
the corporation itself was asked to define the assessment area in which
the sufficiency of its activity would be judged. 20 On its face, this vague
legal regime should encourage cost-benefit evaluations. Indeed, the
statute itself spoke of the balancing of safety and soundness
considerations against the duty to serve a community's credit needs. As
a result, denial of noncompliance, a narrow reading of statutory
obligations, and lack of commitment to the law's purpose should have
116. Jenny Anderson, Wall St. Turns to the Timeout as Punishment, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 8, 2004, at C1 (noting that suspensions imposed by the NASD, NYSE and SEC
informed firms that they have the authority to suspend business and will use it under
appropriate circumstances).
117. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2908 (2005).
118. 12 U.S.C. § 2903(a)(1) (2005).
119. See Statement of the Federal Financial Supervising Agencies Regarding the
Community Reinvestment Act, 43 Fed. Reg. at 47, 148. Prior to 1995 compliance was
judged based on the efforts of the institutions rather than the outcomes produced. See
Community Reinvestment Act Regulations and Home Mortgage Disclosure, Final
Rules, 60 Fed. Reg. 22, 156 and 22, 159 (1995). After 1995, performance based
standards were used - with evaluations of loans made, investments made, and
accessibility of branches and credit services. Id. at 22, 162-67. Yet even after 1995 no
particular level of activity or mix of activity was mandated.
120. 12 C.F.R. § 228.41 (1999).
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been the outcome.
In the early years of the Act's existence, there was indeed a very
modest level of corporate response. In the first ten years of the Act, the
banking industry committed approximately $5 billion in loans pursuant
to the Act.'21
However, the Act contained an important enforcement mechanism
- one not commonly employed. It permitted, but did not require, the
federal regulators to deny an "application for a deposit facility" based on
a poor CRA commitment. 22 This could serve as an important market
based sanction. The term "application for a deposit facility"
encompasses the opening of a new bank branch, the acquisition of a new
line of business, and even the merger of financial institutions. 123 Thus,
denying these applications would deny the institution market share and
profits. At times, this could deprive the institution of a small additional
market presence and profit center (e.g., denial of an application to open
a new branch). At other times it could deprive the institution of
substantial additional market share and profits (e.g., denial of an
application for a merger).
However, in the early years of the Act the potential enforcement
tool was a very low probability risk. In the first ten years of the Act,
only eight of an estimated 40,000 applications were denied on CRA
grounds. 124 Indeed, it was not until 1989 that a merger application was
denied to a big bank on CRA grounds. 25 This type of application would
cause the greatest loss of market share and lost profit opportunity. Thus,
cost-benefit evaluation led to the reasonable conclusion that very modest
commitment to the law's mandate was a reasonable response. Indeed,
many institutions could conclude that no response at all was also a
reasonable response when faced with lost profits due to the extra costs of
CRA commitment and possible increased risks of default by CRA
borrowers.
This evaluation began to change after 1988. In the 1989-94 period,
121. See infra note 130.
122. 12 U.S.C. § 2903 (a)(2) (2005).
123. 12 U.S.C. § 2902(3) (2005).
124. Allen J. Fishbein, The Community Reinvestment Act After Fifteen Years: It
Works, but Strengthened Federal Enforcement Is Needed, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 293,
298 (1993) (calculation by the Center for Community Change).
125. Kenneth H. Thomas, CRA at 25: Reforming an Almost Perfect Law, AM.
BANKER, Dec. 13, 2002, at 6.
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the number of applications denied more than doubled. 126 In addition,
perception of increased risk of enforcement and sanction resulted from a
more than doubling of the approval of applications subject to conditions
or commitments imposed by federal regulations. 27 Finally, after 1989,
the regulators stopped the practice of permitting the institution to agree
to conditions or commitments to offset prior, poor CRA performance
and thereby cause regulators to grant approval for applications for
deposit facilities. 
128
These increased enforcement measures changed the cost-benefit
calculation. Loss of market share due to legal sanction was no longer a
very low probability risk. Lost profits became a cost of noncompliance
rather than a cost of compliance. This view was embraced even though
the overall frequency of market sanctions might be deemed to be low.
12 9
Incentive to comply was generated due to the large cost of the sanction
when it was imposed. In other words, the threshold for viewing the risk
of sanction to be substantial was not a high threshold because the loss of
market share and profits could be substantial.
The industry response was dramatic. By early 1988, only
approximately $5 billion had been committed by banks to CRA loans. 30
However, by 1993, more than $30 billion had been committed as a result
of the CRA.131 By the summer of 1995, this figure had risen to more
126. There were 17 denials on CRA grounds, compared with 8 in the first 10 years
of the Act. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. GAO/GGD-96-23,
COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT: CHALLENGES REMAIN TO SUCCESSFULLY IMPLEMENT
CRA, at 30 (1995) (discussing the effectiveness of CRA and major problems with its
implementation).
127. Conditions or commitments were imposed 58 times in the 1977-82 period but
were imposed 167 times in the 1989-94 period. Id. at 31.
128. See Vincent M. Di Lorenzo, Equal Economic Opportunity: Corporate Social
Responsibility in the New Millennium, 71 U. COLO. L. REv. 51, 95 (2000).
129. Id. at 100.
130. A 1985 study by the Hubert Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs found banks
had committed $3.7 billion under the CRA. Community Reinvestment Act: Hearings
before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., at 99
(1988) (Statement of Calvin Bradford, Senior Fellow, Hubert Humphrey Inst. of Pub.
Affairs). Thereafter, the Center for Community Change estimated an additional $1.5
billion in commitments had been made by early 1988. Id. at 149 (statement of Allen J.
Fishbein, Gen. Counsel, Ctr for Cmty. Change).
131. Fishbein, supra note 124, at 294, 298.
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than $61 billion. 3 2 Through the first quarter of 1998, the figure rose to
more than $397 billion.133 Thereafter, the figure jumped to more than $1
trillion by the year 2000 in the midst of the bank mega mergers. 134 In
other words, market based sanctions induced significantly greater
commitment to compliance with the law's purpose, and in turn market
conditions multiplied the overall quantitative manifestation of that
commitment. This heightened commitment to the Act's purposes has
continued in recent years, with Bank of America, for example,
increasing its CRA commitment from $350 billion in 1998' to $750
billion in 2004.136
Dollar volume of CRA commitments is only one measure of the
Act's success. Another measure is the prevalence of CRA lending
programs among financial institutions subject to the Act. In 1992, a
survey of its members conducted by the Consumer Bankers Association
(CBA) found 91.4 percent of respondents had loan programs in place
targeting low- to moderate-income housing. 137 These programs included
special affordable mortgage products, enhanced marketing plans
targeting minority and low-income groups, and automatic review of loan
rejections. 3 8 They increased in frequency between 1992 and 1993.139 A
132. See NAT'L CMTY. REINVESTMENT COALITION, CRA DOLLAR COMMITMENTS
SINCE 1977 (1995) (calculations completed by the author).
133. See NAT'L CMTY. REINVESTMENT COALITION, CRA COMMITMENTS 1977-1997,
at 11 (1999).
134. Policy Link, Community Reinvestment Act: More Than $1 Trillion Invested
Through CRA, http://www.policylink.org/EDTK/CRA/action.html (last visited Jan. 24,
2006).
135. Olaf de Senerpont Domis & Jaret Seiberg, Nations Bank, Bank America
Challenge Critics on CRA, AM. BANKER, July 10, 1998, at 1 (10 year commitment).
136. Laurie Kulikowski, B of A Details $750 B Commitment, WALL ST. J., Oct. 26,
2004, at 27 (10 year commitment made in light of bank's merger with Fleet Boston). In
2005, the Nat'l Cmty. Reinvestment Coalition reported that CRA agreements have led
to commitments totaling more than $4.2 trillion. NAT'L CMTY. REINVESTMENT
COALITION, CRA COMMITMENTS 1 (2005), available at http://www.ncrc.org/policy/
cra/documents/2005-09-21CRACommitmentsUpdated.pdf (Sept. 21, 2005).
137. See Griffith L. Garwood and Dolores S. Smith, The Community Reinvestment
Act: Evolution and Current Issues, 79 FED. RESERVE BULL. 251, 262 (1993); New
Survey Fills Gaps in HMDA Data, Shows Commitment By Bankers, CBA Says, 59
Banking Rep. 629 (BNA) (Nov. 2, 1992).
138. See Edward Kulkosky, More Flexibility Seen in Lending to Needy, AM.
BANKER, Oct. 7, 1993, at 10.
139. Id. A reduced down payment requirement was reported by 91.2% of
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survey by the New York Banking Department similarly found a
substantial change in bank lending practices over the 1991 to 1993
period. 40  The CBA survey was limited to retail banking institutions
who were members of the CBA. Such institutions focus on home equity
lending. 141 A later survey of the largest retail banking institutions,
including both commercial banks and savings associations, conducted
by the Federal Reserve Board in 2000, found 73 percent of respondents
offered at least one CRA special lending program.
142
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
Law is not necessarily determinative of corporate conduct. In an
industry subject to a vague legal standard, the influence of law on
corporate conduct is weakest. This article examined the conduct of
securities analysts in response to the vague legal mandate provided in
the federal securities law. Yet the legal regime faced by securities
analysts is a regime that is common in United States law. It is a regime
based on (a) a vague legal mandate, that leads to ease of denial of
respondents in 1993, up from 88.6% in 1992. More flexible debt-to-income
requirements were reported by 83.5% of respondents, compared to 82.1% a year earlier.
Relaxed loan-to-value ratios were reported by 80.1% of respondents, up from 71.5% a
year earlier. Increased flexibility in employment requirements was reported by 74.7%
of respondents, against 56.9% a year earlier. In addition, 89% reported accepting
alternative credit histories, such as utility bill and rent payments. This question was not
asked in the earlier survey. See id.
140. See N.Y. State Banks Have Changed Mortgage Lending Practices, Banking
Dep't Reports, 61 Banking Rep. 759 (BNA) (Nov. 15, 1993). Sixty percent of
respondents had made changes in their lending practices during this period, including
requiring lower down-payments, permitting higher housing or debt ratios, and allowing
greater flexibility in the source of funds for down payments and closing costs. Seventy-
eight percent of respondents had procedures for a second review of rejected mortgages,
up from half that had such a procedure in place prior to 1991.
141. Consumer Bankers Association, http://www.cbanet.org (last visited Jan. 12,
2006).
142. Robert B. Avery, Raphael W. Bostic, and Glenn B. Canner, CRA Special
Lending Programs, 86 FED. RESERVE BULL. 711, 714 (2000). The most frequently
mentioned special lending programs offered were more flexible underwriting criteria, a
second review of loan applicants to determine qualifications, special outreach and
marketing activities, waived or reduced fees, pre-loan education or counseling to
applicants, and reduced interest rates.
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wrongdoing and cost-benefit evaluations, (b) prerequisites to legal
liability, that may be individually justified but are difficult to establish
and cause actors to view the risk of sanction as a low probability risk,
and (c) reliance on sanctions such as fines or lawsuits seeking recovery
of damages that impose costs that do not outweigh large perceived
benefits of evasion of the law or, at times, noncompliance.
One response could be to impose clearer legal mandates. The
recent legislative and regulatory response to the conflicts of interest
faced by securities analysts is an example of that sort of response.143
This can reduce the reasonable use of the behavioral tendency to deny
wrongdoing. If vigorously enforced, it can help deter noncompliance,
although not necessarily deter evasion. However, it is unrealistic to
expect that the law can resort to clear legal prohibitions in most cases, in
the sense that denial of noncompliance becomes impossible or at least
implausible. Vague prohibitions and mandates will continue to be the
norm.
How do we achieve a strong commitment to a legal mandate and to
its underlying purposes while utilizing a general (vague) standard that
can apply in a variety of contexts over time? The evidence presented in
143. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 requires the SEC or self-regulatory
organizations to adopt rules that, inter alia, (a) restrict prepublication clearance or
approval by investment banking departments of analysts' research reports, (b) limit
supervision and compensatory evaluations of securities analysts to officials not engaged
in investment banking, and (c) define periods during which brokers or dealers
participating in a public offering should not publish or distribute research reports
relating to the issuer. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 501 (a)
(2002). The SEC has approved such rules proposed by The New York Stock Exchange
and the National Association of Securities Dealers. Order Approving NYSE Proposed
Rule Changes Relating to Research Analyst Conflicts of Interest, Exchange Act Release
No. 34-48252, 68 Fed. Reg. 45875 (Aug. 4, 2003) (stating that analyst compensation is
approved by a compensation committee and may not be based on the analyst's
contribution to the firm's overall investment banking business, analysts may not
participate in pitches or other communications for the purpose of soliciting investment
banking business, and persons not directly responsible for research are restricted from
prepublication review and approval of research reports); Order Granting Accelerated
Approval of Amendments to NYSE Proposed Rule Change Relating to Research
Analyst Conflicts of Interest, Exchange Act Release No. 34-45908, 67 Fed. Reg. 34968
(May 16, 2002) (showing the prohibition on investment banking personnel supervising
analysts or approving research reports, prohibition on tying analyst compensation to a
specific investment banking transaction, and a prohibition on offering favorable
research to induce investment banking business).
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CONDUCT IN THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY?
this article supports three conclusions. First, contrary to the position
adopted in the Principles of Corporate Governance, we must recognize
that cost-benefit evaluations will play an important role in corporate
decisions regarding legal compliance. Second, cost-benefit evaluations
can be used to fashion future responses to corporate misconduct. Any
proposed change in the law should be examined with reference to how it
will change the corporation's cost-benefit evaluation. It is that
evaluation that appears to play a significant role in the misconduct being
addressed. Therefore, the proposed change in the law should have a
direct impact on that evaluation. In an ideal scenario, the proposed
change in the law should significantly increase the risks of
noncompliance to the point where such risks outweigh the benefits of
noncompliance. The final conclusion is that a market based system of
sanctions serves this purpose. The most important benefit to the
industry of any course of conduct is profits based on operations and
market share. A system of market-based sanctions changes this from a
lost benefit due to compliance to a feared loss of benefit due to
noncompliance. As demonstrated by the banking industry experience
under the CRA, this change leads to significantly greater corporate
commitment to legal compliance.
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